Rail Safety FAQs
Frequently asked questions regarding rail safety in Great Britain
Is it safe to travel by train?
What kind of measures could be installed
to prevent accidents?
Why do drivers jump red lights?
Shouldn't drivers be dismissed for passing
a red light?
Couldn't something be done to prevent
a train passing a red light from taking a dangerous route?
Has privatisation made our railways
more dangerous?
Would nationalisation make our railways
safer?
Isn't ATP expensive?
If ATP is so good, why don't some rail managers
want to have it installed?
Isn't there a cheaper alternative to ATP?
What's wrong with TPWS?
Wouldn't £1Bn-£2Bn pounds be
better spent on other ways of saving lives, like hospitals or road?
I often hear of trains being delayed
by signal or points failures - are these dangerous?
What does all this jargon and these acronyms mean?
Is it safe to travel by train?
It is far safer to travel by train than by any other form of land travel.
You are over 15 times more likely to be killed or injured travelling in
a car than on a train. Rail travel could, however, be much safer if safety
measures used on modern railways in other countries was adopted here.
What kind of measures could be installed to prevent
accidents?
The one measure that could make rail travel significantly safer is the
installation of Automatic Train Control (ATP)
or one of its more modern derivatives. ATP would prevent most accidents
caused by trains passing red signals (SPADs)
or or by exceeding speed limits.
Why do drivers "jump" red lights?
No driver will intentionally pass a signal at danger. Unlike road traffic
lights, there is no advantage to be gained. Red signals are protecting
another train on the same track or a set of points that are not correctly
set for the train. Signals passed at danger (SPADs)
are detected by the signalling system or reported by the signaller. The
driver will be interviewed and, depending on the reason, disciplined. Reasons
for passing a signal at danger include:
-
Rail conditions mean that the train's brakes are not as effective as normal
and the train exceeded its normal braking distance, sliding past the signal.
This could be caused by greasy rails or by the residue from "leaves on
the line"
-
A signal failure. Signals "fail safe",
if the signalling system detects that a signal has malfunctioned, it will
be set to danger. This might happen suddenly after the train has passed
the previous signal. Similarly for a track circuit failure.
-
The signaller may set a signal or signals to red if he realises that a
dangerous situation has arisen. For example, another train has derailed.
Again, the driver may have no previous warning that the signal is at danger.
-
The guard/conducter has given the start signal for a train in a station
when the signal is at danger. The diver instinctively starts the train,
forgetting to check the signal. This situation, known as "ding-ding and
away", should be prevented by a device, installed recently on most trains,
called the Driver's Reminder Device (DRA). The platform staff (if any)
and the guard should check that the signal is not at danger before the
start signal is given.
-
The driver mistakenly reads another signal. This could be one beyond the
one he should be obeying ("read-through") or one for an adjacent track.
-
Light conditions may make a signal difficult to see or light reflecting
on the signal may make it appear to be showing a different aspect.
The vast majority of SPADs involve the train passing the signal
by just a few metres, the train stopping well within the overlap.
In these cases there is no danger to the train or its occupants.
Shouldn't drivers be dismissed for passing a red
light?
If a driver passes a red light, he/she will be interviewed. Depending on
the circumstances, they will given advice or training or they will be put
on a list of "at risk" drivers. In appropriate circumstances, they WILL
be dismissed or put on non-driving duties.
Couldn't something be done to prevent a train
passing a red light from taking a dangerous route?
In the past, points onto main lines were protected by trap
points. These would divert an errant train into a sand-drag or would
derail it into a safe area. This "cure" could be worse than the disease
for a high-speed passenger train because it would probably overturn, and
may collide with infrastructure such as electrification masts.
Has privatisation made our railways more dangerous?
It has probably not made them more dangerous, but it has prevented
them being made safer. In the run-up to privatisation the then government
withdrew its commitment (made after the Clapham disaster) to install ATP.
This was done to make it easier to sell off Railtrack by removing a major
investment commitment. Privatisation has also fragmented the railway network,
making it more difficult to carry out safety improvements. It has also
blurred responsibility for safety issues.
Investment in new trains was halted in the run-up to privatisation and
in the period immediately following. This meant that older trains, which
are not so crash-worthy as modern trains, were not replaced as planned.
Train Operating Companies suffer financial penalties if more than a
defined proportion of trains are cancelled. There is therefore an incentive
to run trains with safety equipment not working. The Automatic Warning
System (AWS) on the Great Western train
involved in the Southall crash was not working. They also suffer financial
penalties if more than a certain proportion of trains are late. There is
therefore pressure on drivers to drive trains faster than they might do
otherwise. ATP is unpopular with some railway managers because it limits
train speeds to those the ATP regards as safe.
Would re-nationalisation make our railways
safer?
Probably not. Nationalisation would mean that safety related investment
would come directly out of the public purse and would have to compete with
other, higher profile, government spending such as hospital and schools.
The investment would also be subject to the vagaries of Treasury control
of public spending.
Re-nationalisation would cause a reduction in investment in the period
between the announcement of re-nationalisation and its enactment. No rail
company would carry out investment that it did not absolutely have
to. The effects would be delay safety investment, similar to that in the
run-up to privatisation.
Isn't ATP expensive?
The cost of installing ATP throughout
the network has been put at various figures. £1Bn and £2bn
have been mentioned. There is a strong suspicion, however, that some railway
managers have inflated the costs because they do not want to install ATP.
So-called cost benefit analysis has given a figure of about £14M
for each life saved. No monetary value can be put on the grief and anguish
that a serious rail crash causes. It is not clear whether the benefits
included all the costs of disruption, re-imbursement of season ticket holders
and disruption to regular travellers lives caused by a crash. There is
strong evidence that people have been put off using trains by the recent
crashes. They are probably travelling by road instead and therefore at
much greater risk of death or injury. Train companies income is also reduced
if people stop using the train.
If ATP is so good, why don't some rail managers
want to have it installed?
Most of the versions of ATP installed
in Europe, and installed experimentally in Great Britain, reduce track
capacity. A complete empty block section
is maintained behind each train, whereas with convention signalling there
may be only the overlap (300 yards,
288 metres) between trains (worst case). This reduces the number of trains
per hour that can travel along one track.
Because ATP imposes speed limits rigidly, there is less scope for late
trains to make up time.
Isn't there a cheaper alternative to ATP?
Yes, TPWS. A decision was taken a few
months ago to install TPWS throughout the network, except on the West Cost
Main Line where a sophisticated moving-block signalling system was planned
to be installed. The cost of TPWS has been estimated at £200M to
£300M.
What's wrong with TPWS?
TPWS will not stop trains within the
overlap
if they are exceeding about 75 mph . Therefore it will not prevent some
collisions that ATP would prevent. It would have prevented the Paddington
crash but not that at Southall. It will apply the brakes of a train going
past a red signal, so the effect of a collision may be less.
ATP would be installed throughout
a route and trains would be continuously under its control. TPWS would
be installed only at those signals where the effect of a SPAD
was considered to be serious.
Wouldn't £1Bn-£2Bn pounds be better
spent on other ways of saving lives, like hospitals or road safety?
This may have been a valid argument when the railways were nationalised
and funds for rail safety competed with other government spending. With
the privatised railway, and with Railtrack making significant profits,
capital spending on the railways no longer comes directly from public spending.
There is no reason why money cannot be invested in both hospitals, for
example, and rail safety.
Installing ATP on Britain's railways
would virtually eliminate train collisions. It would also eliminate accidents
caused by trains going too fast round curves. Road safety, on the other
hand, can only be improved by changing road users behaviour. This is far
more difficult and the effects of spending large sums of money on this
could not be confidently predicted.
I often hear of trains being delayed by signal
or points failures - are these dangerous?
No. Signals and points are, like most railway equipment, designed to "fail
safe". Mechanisms and electrical circuits are in place to detect such
failures. If a points failure is detected then the signals protecting it
remain will at red. If a signal failure is detected then it will be instructed
to display a red aspect. If the failure means that it cannot display red
(if a bulb has blown, for example) then the previous signal will be set
to red.
What does all this jargon and these acronyms mean?
See the glossary on the The
Railway Passenger Safety pages or go to the Railway
Technical Web Pages.
Back to the The Railway Passenger Safety
pages.
Page updated 28th November 1999